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I. Introducff on z 0 
lmag~ne that a company conducts a voluntary envi- 3 s 
I ronmental audit. As a result of that audit the company s 
learns it is In violation of the law. It reports the v~olation 
to the authorities and brings its operat~on into compli- 
ance. Should the company face a governmental enforce- 
ment action? 
This is not an easy question, Absolving the company 
of liability would arguably reward it. not lust for its hon- 
esty, but for its violation as well. It would reap the eco- 
Nastygram nomic benefit of its noncompliance with environmental 
Federalism: regulations and suffer no penalty when the v~olat~on is 
revealed. On the other hand, pun~sh~ng the company 
carr1e.s its own potentially serious drawbacks. Vigorously 
A Look at prosecuting a regulated entity for admitting and correct- 
Federal Environmental ing its error could pose a s~gnificant deterrent to any 
Self-Audit Policy future self-polic~ng by the regulated community. The federal government, in the gulse of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency), has 
By Davrd N. CUSSU~O" sought the middle ground on th~s  Issue. The Agency's 
stated policy encourages self-audits without ceding its 
enforcement power EPA enumerated its policy In two 
successive guidance documents released In 1995 (with 
the second one superceding the first). In both its lnterim 
Policy Statement! (issued April 3. 1995) and Final Policy 
Statemehtz (issued December 22, 19951, the Agency 
offered varlous rncentives to lndustnes to spur them to 
self-audit, including reduung economic penalties and 
not recommending cr~minal prosecutlon.3 
Nineteen states have gone further. enacting laws 
granting varlous degrees of privilege to audit results 
6 Davrd N Cassuto received hrs I D from the Un~versity of 
Califomla. 6oalt Hall School of Law In 1998 He currently clerks for 
the Honh Rosemary Barkett on the United States Court of Appeals 
for the 1 I th Circuit. His k k ,  D R ~ ~ N C  DRY LITERANRE+ P o r n  & 
WATER IN THE D E S E R T W ~ ~  IS forthcoming from the Unrversity of 
Michigan Press. The author would like to thank Arthur Haubenstock 
and john W e r  for therr aid and adv~ce with thls project. 
1. i'oluntary Environmental Self-Poliung and Self-Disclosure 
lnterim Policy Statement. 60 Fed Reg 16,875 f 19951 lherernafter 
Interim Policy Statement] 
2. lncentlves for Self-Policing. Dlscovery, Disclosure. 
Correction and Preventlon of V~olatlons, 60 Fed. Reg 66,706 119951 
lhereinafter Final Policy Statementl 
3. EPKs position presented a srgnificant departure from its 
previous stance, whlch was 'EPA will not prornlse to forego Inspec- 
tions. reduce enforcement responses, or offer other such Incentives 
In exchange for Implementation of environmental auditlng or other 
sound environmental management practices" United States 
Environmental Protection Ageng Envrronrnental Auditing Policy 
Statement, 51 Fed Reg 25.004.25.007 (1986) 
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and in some cases giving Immunity to the vio- 
lator? States with prlvilege and Immunity laws 
clalm that in order to provide industry with an 
adequate Incentive to self-police, the govern- 
ment must offer sufficient guarantees that they 
will not prosecute violators who disclose and 
remediate on the~r own initlatlve. Proponents 
of the state initiatives label the federal policy a 
"seek and ye shall be fined" approach to envi- 
ronmental management. 
In states with privilege laws, regulated 
entities can refuse to disclose regulatory viola- 
tions discovered during voluntary self-audits 
as long as they correct the vlolat~ons withln a 
statutorily designated time period. States with 
immunity reglmes disallow penalties for vlola- 
t~ons that are discovered through internal self- 
audits and then corrected voluntarily. 
EPA strongly opposed the majority of state 
initiatives, arguing that many prlvilege and 
immunity statutes curtail the public's right to 
know, interfere with the government's enforce- 
ment capability, foster litigation, and give an 
unfair advantage to violators over those who 
4. States with some form of self-audit laws include: 
Arkansas. Colorado, Idaho. Illinois. Indiana. Kansas. 
Kentucky. Michigan, Minnesota. Mississippi, New 
Hampshire. New Jersey, Oregon. South Carolina. South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virglnla and Wyomlng. For a capsule 
discussion of each state's policy, see ELIZABETH GLASS 
GELTMAN,  COMPLETE GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS 21 1- 
58 (1997). 
5. See, e.g., Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, 
Asslstant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance, EPA and Mary Nichols, Office of 
Air G Radiation, to Jackson Fox. Regional Counsel. Region 
X (Apr. 5. 1996). Re: "Effect of Audit Immunity/Privilege 
Laws on States' Ability to Enforce Title V Requnements" 
lhereinafter "Memorandum from Steven Herman"] ("EPA 
has consistently opposed blanket amnesties which 
excuse repeated noncompliance, cnminal conduct. or 
violations that result In serious harm or risk, as well as 
audit prlvileges that shield evidence of violations from 
regulators and jeopardize the public's right-to-know 
about noncompliance."); see also David A. Dana. The Perverse 
Incentives of Envrronmental Audit Immunity, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
969. 975-76 (1996) (arguing that immunity statutes serve 
more as hazard management than hazard prevention. 
since offering Immunity for past wrongs provldes no 
incentive not to violate In the future). 
6. The lntenm Policy Statement however, does sug- 
gest, without elaboration, that the EPA will helghten its 
scrutiny of envlronmental programs in states that have 
comply with environmental laws.5 Neverthe- 
less, neither the Interim Policy nor the Final 
Policy Statement enumerate? EPA':; likely reac- 
tion to state-created audit protections." To 
date, the Agency's responses have ranged from 
silence to threats to revoke states' authority to 
~mplement federal envlronmental laws (as dia- 
grammed in State Implementation Plans, or 
"SIPsU).7 Most debates have ended in compro- 
mise. 
The varying state and federal policles 
result from different judgments about how 
best to enforce envlronmental laws. EPA main- 
tains that companies already have adequate 
incentive to self-audit, that EPP, policy pro- 
vides further incentive, and that fear of govern* 
mental enforcement 1s not the prlmary factor 
deterring companies from instituting self-audit 
programs.8 The Agency further argues that 
additional incentives (i.e., state privilege 
and/or immunity statutes) undermine the deli- 
cate competitive balance among regulated 
entities.9 It reasons that entitles reslding in 
states with privilege and/or Immunity statutes 
passed laws protecting audit results. Interim Pollcy 
Statement. supra note 1, at 16.878. 'The Final Pollcy 
Statement, in addition to outlining EPA's firm opposition 
to statutory envlronmental audit prlvileges and immunl- 
ties, declares the agency's willingness ti1 work with states 
to address any provlslons of state laws that are inconsis- 
tent with the federal policy. See Final Policy Statement, 
supra note 2, at 66,712. 
7 See Lynn L. Bergeson & Llsa M. Campbell, The 
Debate Over Envrronmental Auditing. THE WASHINGTON LAWYER. 
SeptJOct. 1997, at 43 ("Although EPA has made threats In 
various states. no state, to date, has been deprived of del- 
egated authority as a result of Its environmental audit 
pnvilege provlslons."). 
8. Sec Commercral and Adm~natrative Law Proltclion of 
Envrronmental Self-Evaluation Data: Heantla Before the Comm 
on the Judicrary, 104th Cong. (June 29 10951 (statement of 
Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. U.S EPA) 
lhereinaker "Testimony of Steven Herman"1 Indeed. the 
agency maintains that a strong enforcement mechanism 
provldes a necessary Incentive for lntlustries to partici- 
pate In voluntary compliance programs. Brian Riedel. 
U.S. EPA, Vice Chair (Office of Planning and Pollcy 
Analysis), Office of Enforcement and Compliance, 
Address to Russian delegation, San 1:rancisco (June 20, 
1997). 
9. See Testimony of Steven Herman, supra note 8 
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galn a competitive advantage over those resid- 
Ing elsewhere. In addit~on, even withln states 
with such statutes, entitles willing to bend the 
rules will galn over those choosing to comply 
strlctly with the law.10 
Supporters of the state laws present a dif- 
ferent scenario. They argue that encouraging 
companles to self-audit leads to greater envi- 
ronmental compliance and mlnlmlzes business 
uncertainties. Additionally, proponents main- 
tam, uslng the results of an audit that was vol- 
untarily conducted and disclosed to penalize 
the auditor deters voluntary compliance and 
casts a pall over the buslness climate.11 
The resulting conflict between EPA and the 
states has generated a flurry of "nastygrams" 
sent by the Agency to varlous states,l2 threaten- 
Ing to suspend or withhold a state's ability to 
Implement federal pollut~on laws.13 In other 
cases, EPA has s~mply asked for clarification 
and assurance from the states that the~r audit 
laws would not interfere with the~r enforcement 
capability.14 
Thls Article examlnes the evolut~on of EPA's 
audit policy, explores the reasons for states' dis- 
satisfaction with it, and then discusses whether 
the federal policy should have been issued as a 
rule under the Admin~strative Procedure Act 
(APA).15 Part I examines the evolut~on of the 
federal audit policy and then analyzes the 
strengths and weaknesses of the policy tn its 
10. See 1995 Minn. Law 168 $0 8. 10. 
11. See, e.g.. State Official Promotes Flexibility of 
Pennsylvanta Self-Audit Plan, Buslness Publishers, Inc., Solid 
Waste Report, April 4. 1996, awitabk m LEXIS. Environ 
Library (discussing the head of Pennsylvania's 
Department of Env~ronmental Protection's support for the 
state's plan to refram from penalizing companles that dis- 
cover v~olations dunng compliance audits); Letter from 
Richard Graves. Flonda Chamber of Commerce, to the 
editors, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, April 6. 1996. availnbk t n  
LEXIS. Nexls Library. Cumnews file (argulng that Florida's 
self-audit leg~slation is "known as the 'Find It, Fix It' bill 
because that's prec~sely what it encourages the finding 
and fixlng of small environmental problems before they 
become big ones"); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Patenlially 
Perverse Effects of Corporate Cnmtnal Ltability. 23 1. LEGAL STUD 
833, 833-37 (1994) (discussing how liability for vlolat~ons 
found through Internal auditing will reduce audit~ng 
rather than violations). 
12. States recemng nastygrarns include California, 
Colorado and Idaho. The nastygrarns seemed designed to 
current form Part I1 explores varlous types of 
ev~dentiary prlvilege and looks at the arguments 
for and against extending the pr~vilege to audit 
reports. It then offers a s~milar analysis of the 
case for limited immunity, concluding that nei- 
ther an expanded prrvilege nor Immunity IS nec- 
essary to encourage compliance audits, and 
that both provisions can senously undermine 
the public's right to know andsthe Agencys law 
enforcement abilities Part I11 clarifies the dis- 
tinction between policies and rules under the 
APA in order t~ determ~ne whether EPA's audit 
policy 1s actually a rule In disguise 
The Article concludes that the federal audit 
policy offers suffic~ent enticements to 1ndustt-y 
to self-audit The overall goal of both the state 
and federal pglic~es hould be heightened com- 
pliance with envlr~nmenta! Eaws Yet, state 
statutes bedeck the audit process with tncen- 
tives to the pant where companles potent~aIIy 
could gain more by auditing than through corn- 
plylng w~th the law Such laws treat audits as an 
end in themselves This is a dangerous trend 
Business uncerta~ntles concerning the lnterpre- 
tatlon and impact of environmental laws shoutd 
be allayed through compliance rather than 
through audits alone The federa! audit policy, 
unadorned by prlvilege or tmrnunity clauses, 
d ~ e s  not hallow audits. but offers ~ n t y  limited 
Incentives as part of an ~verall peticy of encour- 
aging lawful behavior 
setve ncat~ce that the EPA wauIrl f r ~ x n  an pnnilege an3 
Immunlv legislatran enacted b; the stxes St Envir~. 
Audib~g EPA Oppos~lron Quekk~j 9 m ~  S t~ t t  Bilk Greew81 re 
June 12, 1906, avarlable rn LEXIS, Envrron Crbwry 
13 Same supporters ef the state Inrtrseves have 
sc~ffed at EPXs threat, csPl~ng LC ' h s ! [ ~ x  Isrnes 0 ReiII;.. 
corporate caarnseh fer Pr~ctor E G3rnbTe rernsrked thst rn 
light af federal budget reatttres "EPA pmbabIy ~ u l d  be 
unable tooperate acsrnplex permtttrng pragmm tbrangh 
~ t s  regional offices EPA Sags State lmmunrly Pnr~kgt h~; 
May Undcrmrne Atr Act Enjontmunt Pd~lrs Daily 
Environment Repsner Aprrl 15 19%. P V J I ? J & ~  la LEXI3, 
Envlrsn L~brary Far 6nfsmatron regarding EPAs strategc 
use of Inspeaton resources U S EPA Enfoxamtnt m tk 
1990s Pn;eil4-59 to 4-63 I I%!) 
14 For a dtscrrsst~n of state sell-audit ststutes and 
EPAs response to the vsnous la.r;s, see St~tz lmmunitir 
Prrrilege Laws Eramtned fax Conflrcls Ilfizctrng Drftgdtd 
Prqrdms, Dally Environment Report Sep 18, I996 ar?o~LCk 
m LEXIS, Envlran Ltbrary 
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z Perhaps even more ~mportantly, a rule i mandat~ng an adm~n~strat~ve enforcement pro- cedure would create far more problems than it 
3 would solve. Agenc~es have enormous discre- 
t ~ o n  over when to Institute enforcement 
act~ons. That discretion IS both court-defined 
and salutary.16 Agencles are far better 
equ~pped than the courts to declde when and 
how to expend thelr enforcement resources.17 
A rule sett~ng out the requlrements for enforce- 
ment act~ons would obligate the Agency to 
meet those requ~rements when dec~ding 
whether or not to enforce. Addit~onally, it 
would create the potentlal for boundless lit~ga- 
tlon because defendants could lit~gate every 
facet of the rule's enforcement prerequ~sites. 
The federal audit policy also does not 
appear to be a camouflaged rule wh~ch should 
have undergone a rulemak~ng In accordance 
with the APA.18 Neither the APA, nor the courts, 
have created a definitive test for different~at~ng 
polic~es from rules. Therefore, it IS difficult to 
state with certa~nty that the audit policy should 
not be subject to a rulemak~ng. Nevertheless, 
the policy survlves both a Force of Law and a 
Substantla1 Impacts analys1s.19 the two extant 
ludicla1 tests for determ~n~ng whether a policy 
IS actually a rule In disgu~se. Recently, EPA has 
also demonstrated a growlng sensit~vity to the 
nuances different~at~ng polic~es from rules. 
Considered In the aggregate, these factors 
make a strong case that the audit policy need 
not undergo a rulemak~ng procedure, nor 
should it. 
16. See Heckler v. Chaney. 470 U.S. 82 1. 83 1 ( 1985) 
["Th~s Court has recognized on several occasions over 
many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or 
enforce, whether through civil or crlmlnal process, IS a 
decision generally committed to an agency's absolute dis- 
cretion."]. 
17. See ld. 
18. See 5 U.S.C. g 553 (b) (1994). 
19. See Aman & Mayton, lnfra note 93qand accompa- 
nylng text. 
20. Interim Policy Statement, supra note 1 ,  at 
16,877 
21. lndustr~es may institute numerous other meth- 
11. Development of EPA's Environmental 
Audit Policy 
EPA defines an env~ronmenial audit as "a 
systemat~c, documented, perloclic and oblec- 
t~ve revlew by regulated entitles of facility 
operat~ons and pract~ces related to meet~ng 
env~ronmental requ1rements."*0 Audits constl- 
tute one facet of a larger environmental man- 
agement scheme,21 offerlng periodic, or occa- 
s~onal ~nspect~ons des~gned to Identify ex~st- 
Ing areas of noncompliance end facilitate 
the~r correction. Audits can alscl help locate 
areas of employee noncompliance, thereby 
encouraging Increased attentlveness among 
the rank and file. 
In theory, self-audits reduce bus~ness 
fears and enhance government monitor~ng 
capabilities by enlisting the alcl of the regu- 
lated entitles themselves. The Agency galns 
because it can husband its th~nly stretched 
enforcement resources. Regulated enti tles 
benefit because they can cat,:h v~olat~ons 
before they become too serlous (and some- 
times before they even occur), thereby sparing 
themselves potentially severe penalties The 
public benefits because Increased compliance 
with env~ronmental laws br~ngs accompany- 
lng Improvements In public health and the 
environment. And last, companies already In 
compliance galn through the establishment of 
a level play~ng field In whlch to do bus~ness. 
Though EPA Issued its first authoritat~ve 
policy on envlronmental audits In 198b,iZ 
industries have long recognized that volun- 
tary compliance audits often serve the~r best 
ods for ensurlng env~ronmental compliance The dr,tft 
federal sentencing guidelines for corporate envirorrmen- 
tal crimes suggest, among other tactlcs, contlnuolls on- 
site monitoring, by specifically trained compliance pcr- 
sonnel and by other means." as well as regular arid ongo- 
lng employee trainlng and Incentives Advisory Croup on 
Environmental Sanctions, U S Senttnclng Cornrn'n, 
Env~ronmental Gu~delines for Oraan~zalions. 3 9Dl I (a)(7)(iii) 
(Nov, 16, 1973 Draft), reprinted In Oraanlz~na for Corparale 
Compliance: Toward Standards, Cl I0 ALI-ABA 287, 702-03 
(Mar. 1995); see also Dana. supra note 5 at (575 G n 27 
22. Env~ronmental Auditing Policy Statement. T I  
Fed. Reg. 25.1104 ( 1986) The Agency did. however, publish 
an interim policy statement In November, 1985 Scr 50 
Fed. Reg. 46.504 ( 1985) 
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1nterests.23Audits prov~de Industry with an early 
warnlng system through whlch to detect exlst- 
Ing and potentla1 env~ronmental v~olations. 
Managers can Identify and remediate lnclplent 
problems, mlnlmlzlng env~ronmental ~mpacts. 
and reduclng the probability of clvil or cr~mlnal 
enforcement actlons. They can also redes~gn 
overs~ght and management systems to avo~d 
future v~olat~ons. In addit~on, audits can play an 
Important role In avo~ding citizen suits by pro- 
vlding informat~on that goes beyond mere com- 
pliance data concerning nonregulatory envrron- 
mental, health and safety problems.24 
In EPA's 1986 audit policy, the Agency 
sought to encourage envlronmental self-audits 
and stated that it would not routinely request 
coples of the audit reports.25 It also Indicated 
that facilities with self-audit systems In place 
would be subled to fewer 1nspectlons.26 While 
the 1986 policy demonstrated the Agency's pref- 
erence that facilit~es conduct self-audits, as~de 
from its unquantified promlse of "fewer Inspec- 
t~ons," however, it offered little In the way of 
tangible encouragement to do so. In effect, the 
Agency asked regulated entitles that elected t~ 
self-audit to s~mply trust that the audit results 
would not be used agalnst them. 
Though EPA stated that it would not rou- 
tlnely demand coples of audit reports, it 
reserved the rlght to request them whenever 
necessary.27 Furthermore, despite its stated 
preference for self-audits, EPA declined to alter 
its enforcement response based on whether a 
facility self-audited.28 In short, though the 1986 
policy defined a clear Agency preference and 
h~nted at Agency cooperation, it failed to make 
self-audit~ng sufficiently attractlve to regulated 
entities.29 Because it did not create explicit 
Agency gu~delines, the policy did not prov~de 
companies with any degree of certa~nty while 
leavlng them exposed to substant~af enforce- 
ment actlons 
A. The lntenm Policy 
In 1995. EPA announced a new, lnterrm 
Policy des~gned to provtde rncentlves for entt- 
ties to self-audit " Compan~es that self-audited 
and met certaln conditmns would enpy 
reduced civil penalties and a commitment from 
the Agency not to refer the case to the 
Department of lust~ce for cr~rnlnal prosecu- 
tion C~nditlons For lessened Agency response 
Included- 
1 lbluntary seEf-polic~ng-regulated 
entity must discover the violatton 
through a voluntary audit or self-evalu- 
atlon rather than through statutory 
~bligatlon 
2 Voluntary disclosure-entity must 
disclose the vlolatlon to the approprt- 
ate state and federal agencies as soon 
as ~t IS discovered 
3 Prompt correct~on-vrofatt~n must 
be carrected withln slxty days or, if more 
tlme 1s needed. as expeditiorrsEy as pos- 
sible 
4 Remediatlon ef m-~mtnent and sub- 
stant~al endangerment-entrty must 
promptly remediate any csnditron 
whlch may cause trnrnrnent and sub- 
stantlal ham to humans ar the envr- 
ronment 
5 Remediatlon sf ham and preuen- 
tlon of repeat vtolatmesss 
6.  No lack of appmprtate preventive 
measures-vralatron cannot rndicate 
that entlty failed to take approprrate 
steps to avo~d repeat or recunrng vrola- 
tlons 
23. Sez Terrell Hunt G Timothy \?rllk~ns, 
Enmronmental Audits and Et~forcetnct~t Policy, 16 HaF?: E~J:TL L 
REV. 365,371 (1992). 
24. See id. 
25. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 
5 1 Fed. Reg. at 25.007. 
26. See ~ d .  
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29 Sn 03':d S;7rens3n C ~ m r n e n t  Tht US 
Etlnntrn:tnrrll Pa!sr~,ri! ,%7<1li0. Et~tnI Eniir~c~nmtn!~I , + u l l ~ t i ~ ~  
Pday al:.i PJ:L~II!~.I! CIT~!!;~:I bilk SWIc-Crzd!d Enr~ronrncnr~i 
Audrt Prrrikgc Lar. Q T , ,  E'.'.TL L I 453 4% 1 Epcrujl, j<<of.j~, 
Hunt 6 \l:tiik~ns srrrw nile 23 st. 364  G Van Velsor \VJYJ, 
Is SIf-AudiI Pniiltll? ael D;:;t:urt 3 3 1 %  All-AB?. 531 543 
( l(i961 
30 SPE Intertlli. PaI121 St3tem~nt supm note I ,  at 
16.875 
3 1 SPC ri at lb 877-78 
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z 7 Cooperat~on-entity must cooper- i ate as  requ~red by EPA and prov~de such lnformatlon as  IS necessary to  
1 determine applicability of the policy.32 
The reduced clvil penalt~es Included EPA's 
commitment t o  seek recovery of only the eco- 
nomlc benefit gamed through noncompli- 
ance33 rather than "gravity-based" penaltles34 
from entitles whlch met all the requlrements 
set forth In the policy.35 The Agency further 
agreed to  lessen gravity-based penalties by 75 
percent In cases where most but not all of the 
conditions are met.36 
The lnter~m Policy expressed EPA's strong 
opposition to  state statutes grantlng varlous 
forms of Immunity t o  entitles performing self- 
audits and/or prlvileglng the results of those 
audits.37 In the Agency's vlew, such privileges 
and lmmunitles, "could be used t o  shleld cnm- 
lnal misconduct, drlve up litlgatlon costs and 
create an atmosphere of distrust between reg- 
ulators, Industry, and local communit1es."38 In 
addition, EPA maintamed that, slnce the prln- 
clpal rationale for self-audit statutes lay In lim- 
itlng the exposure of entitles that conduct self- 
audits and act on thelr findings, and slnce the 
lnterlm Policy addressed these concerns, state 
self-audit statutes that exceeded EPA's policy 
33. See lnterlm Policy Statement, supra note 1, at 
16,877 The agency's purpose In recovering economlc ben- 
efits was to "preserve a level playlng field In whtch v~ola- 
tors do not galn a competitive advantage through non- 
compliance." Id. 
34. Gravity-based penalties are those that exceed 
the amount necessary to recover any economlc benefit 
the violator m~ght have reaped as a result of the violation. 
See Sorenson. supra note 29 at n.25. 
35. The potential savlngs to the regulated entity 
arlslng from its escaplng gravity-based penalties can be 
substantial. For example, GTE Corporation recently dis- 
closed and resolved 600 violations at 314 facilities In 21 
states. The settlement between GTE and EPA requlres the 
company to pay a $52,264 penalty tntended to offset the 
economlc galn acqutred through noncompliance. 
Because GTE disclosed and remediated according to the 
audit policy, however, EPA watved another $2.8 million In 
gravity-based penalties. See "GTE Corrects 600 Violations 
Through EPA's Self-Disclosure Policy," A U D ~  POLICY UPDATE, 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, VOLUME 3 
No. 1, Mar. 1998 (on file with author). 
served only t o  hlnder enforcement efforts.39 
Consequently, the Agency stated its lntent~on 
t o  "scrutlnlze enforcement more closely" In 
states with self-audit statutes ancl t o  Increase 
federal enforcement where the  Agency 
believed the statutes Interfered with a state's 
ability t o  meet federal requlrements for 
enforcement and protecting the citlzenry.40 
B. The Final Policy 
EPA Invited response t o  the lr~terlm policy 
from the public, Industry, pukllic Interest 
groups and state offic~als.~' In December, 1995, 
the Agency released its final policy state- 
ment.42 Among lndustrys chlef concerns with 
the lnterlm Policy had been the pa3rameters of 
"voluntary" reports and "voluntary" audits.43 It 
was not clear, for example, whethzr vrolatrons 
discovered as part of an entity's due diligence 
qualified for penalty mitlgatlon. The Final 
Policy Statement attempted to  address rndus- 
try complaints by clarifying the definition of 
voluntary disclosure and statlng that certaln 
monitoring efforts, whlch were zrguably not 
"voluntary," ~ncluding an entity's due diligence. 
would not per s e  disqualify an entity from 
penalty mitlgat1on.~4 The Final Policy 
Statement also clarified the requlrements for 
walver or dimlnutlon of gravity-based penal- 
36. See lntertm Policy Statement, supra note I ,  at 
16.877 
37 See rd. at 16,878. 
38. Id. 
39. See rd. The lnterlm Policy Statement argued that 
granting additional privileges and lmmunity to self-audl- 
tors would undermine efforts to open up environmental 
decistonmaking to public scrutiny, shield bad actors and 
conceal crucial information and Increase litlgatlon as 
opposing sides battled over what was and was not privi- 
leged or Immune 
40. See rd; see also, Enforcement: Lowr 1'tnaltb Seen EU 
Enforcement Chief Under Upcomlng EPA Policy on Cornpanu 
Audits, 25 ENV'T REP (BNA) 2379 (Mar 3 1. 1995). 
41. See Inter~m Policy Statement, srrpra note I ,  at 
16,875. 
42. See Final Policy Statement. supra note 2, at 
66.706. 
43. See Wolf. supra note 29 at 543. 
44. See Final Policy Statement, sullra note 2, at 
66,708. 
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ties, refining the language of the lnter~m Policy 
and In the process expanding the list of pre- 
requisites from seven to nlne: 
1. Violat~on must have been discov- 
ered pursuant to an env~ronmental 
audit or other systematic procedure. 
2. Regulated entity must have discov- 
ered the v~olatlon voluntarily-not 
through a legally mandated monitorlng 
program. 
3. The entity must disclose v~olat~ons 
with~n ten days of its discovery. 
4. D~sclosure must precede any 
Agency actlon or cit~zen suit. 
5 Entity must correct the v~olation 
within sixty days or notify the Agency 
In writ~ng as to why it will take longer. 
6. Entity must agree In writlng to 
Institute measures to prevent recur- 
rence. 
7 Same or srmilar v~olation cannot 
have occurred at the facility withln the 
last three years, nor can it be part of a 
pattern of v~olatrons by parent organl- 
zation over prevlous five years. 
8. Violat~on must not have resulted In 
serious harm or Imminent and sub- 
stant~al endangerment to human 
health or the envlronment, nor can it 
have v~olated the terms of any ludic~al 
order or consent agreement. 
9 Entity must cooperate with EPA by 
prov~ding informat~orf and access to 
empl0yees.~5 
If an entity does not discover the v~olat~on 
through an audit or s~milar procedure, but sat- 
~sfies the remalnlng criteria, EPA will reduce 
gravity-based penalt~es by 75 percent.& 
45. Id. at 66.712. 
46. See id. at 66.711. The language concernlng 
reduc~ng gravity-based penalties represented a substan- 
tial improvement In clarity from the interim Policy 
Statement. Whereas the Final Policy stated that the 
penalties would be reduced 75 percent if  the entity satis- 
fied conditions 2-9, the intenm Policy had s a ~ d  that penal- 
ties may be reduced "up to" 75 percent where 'mostq con- 
ditions were met. Id. at 66.707. 
47. See Id. 
a 
z The Final Policy Statement also declares 
that EPA will not recommend cases for crrm1- 3 
nal prosecutlon if v~olators meet the nlne z 
requ~rements listed above, and the~r manage- s I) 
-I 
ment does not show a conscious involvement 
with, or willful blindness to, the violat1ons.47 
And. as with the lnter~m Policy. the Agency 
declared that it would not routinely request or 
use audit reports to tnit~ate ~nvest~gations, 
though it reserved the r~ght to request the 
reports if it galns Independent knowledge of a 
v~o la t~on .~Vf ,  for example. EPA learned 
through a t ~ p  from a company employee or 
through some other form of monitorlng that a 
company that had recently completed an audit 
was out of compliance. the Agency could 
request the audit results as part of its enforce- 
ment effort. 
Though the Final Policy Statement elimi- 
nates much of the uncerta~nty and confusron 
arrstng from the lnter~m Policy, critics compla~n 
that several cruc~al Issues remaln unresolved 
and that the Final Policy Statement fails to pro- 
v~de any s~gnificant relief t~ regulated lndus- 
trIes4' First. the line between gravity-based 
penalt~es (the punitive portlon of the finej and 
recovery of any economlc benefit reaped from 
the v~olat~on (the "level playlng field" compo- 
nent) IS far from clear- Second. though €PA 
declares that it may decline to seek any recov- 
ery where the economlc galn IS "inslgnificant," 
it does not specify what "inslgnificant amount" 
means.50 
Thlrd. perhaps the most s~gnificant flaw rn 
the Final Policy Statement. according to one 
commentator. lies In its failure to elaborate 
how entitles that self-audit would be protected 
from th~rd-party suits. If an entity self-audits 
and discloses the ~nformation, ~t could then face 
exposure to toxlc tort suits or. In a more likely 
48. 9 r 1 d  
49 Srr, e g  N'olf. supra note 29, at 545. Clinton E 
Elliott, Kentucfiys Enr~ronmtntaI Spy-Aud11 Pnvlftqt Staft 
Protcctlon or Inzrwsd Fdtral Scmt1ny7 23 N KY L RE: I ,  I2 
IlW5); Ronald E Cardwell, Sdf-Aud~t Act An lnrentrw for 
\'aluntary Cnmp!lrlnce? 8-0ct S C Law 38, 41-42 L 1996g; 
50 Srr tV~l f ,  supm note 29 at 545 An agency source 
who w~shes to rernaln anonymous notes. however, that 
"six flgures IS a g a d  rule of thumb 
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scenario, to potentially devastating citlzen 
enforcement suits filed by public Interest 
groups.51 Suits in tort requlre a showing of harm 
and accompanying proof of causat~on. But pro- 
bative showings of harm and causation are 
often difficult, especially because not all viola- 
tions result In harm and even when they do, it IS 
often difficult to link conclus~vely the violatlon 
to the harm. Citizen enforcement suits, by con- 
trast, requlre no such showlng of harm; the only 
harm they need to prove IS the existence of the 
vlolation itself.52 Consequently, the specter of 
such suits, whlch often call for clvil penalt~es 
and attorney's fees, as well as requlrlng a costly 
defense, can be soberlng to a company consld- 
ering a voluntary compliance audit. 
First, the Final Policy Statement declines to 
specify EPA's methodology for determining eco- 
nomlc benefit for a glven v~olat~on. Generally, 
however, the Agency utilizes the BEN model for 
determlnlng economic benefit.53 While EPA 
does not specify whether it Intends to apply 
BEN to all laws and v ~ o l a t ~ o n s , ~ ~  thls seems a 
minor problem and one that IS easily remedied 
either through querylng the Audit Policy Qulck 
Response Team (QRT)55 or durlng the Agency's 
follow-up studies.56 
The second critlclsm IS of the Agency's fail- 
ure to specify the preclse amount of economic 
benefit that would spur the Agency to attempt 
recovery and IS even less valid. Entitles audit to 
51. See rd. at 546; Elliott, supra note 49 at 14-15 
(audit documents subject to public revlew "may provlde a 
wealth of Information for env~ronmental organ~zations 
and public Interest groups acting as private attorneys 
general"). 
52. The vlolatlon must be present or demonstrably 
lmmlnent, however, past v~olations do not suffice for 
standing In citizen suits. See Steel Company v. Citizens for 
a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), 1998 WL 8804 
( U S .  I l l )  at '13-14 (1998). 
53. BEN IS a computer modeling method that esti- 
mates the economlc benefit gamed by a company through 
its failure to comply with env~ronmental regulations. 
Among the criteria used In maklng the determination are 
the cost of obtalnlng the necessary permits; time spent 
out of compliance; the requ~red capital Investment; and 
the Interest on capital gamed dur~ng noncompliance. For 
further Information on the BEN model, see EPA Office of 
Compliance Assurance (OECA) website at (v~sited May 14, 
1999) http://es.epa.gov/oecalmodels/ben.html. 
54. See Wolf, supra note 29 at 545 (argu~ng that with 
correct exrstlng and potentlal vlolations, head 
off enforcement measures, and nwwnlze the 
rlsk of accident, injury, costly litiga1:lon and bad 
public relations. If an entity decides not to self- 
audit out of concern that EPA will seek to recov- 
er economic benefits, two likely conclus~ons can 
be extrapolated: ( I )  the entity has committed a 
violatlon that has brought it a elzable illicit 
return (otherwise the specter of loslng those 
benefits would not offer cause for c~ncern); and 
(2) since minor compliance vlolaticns are rarely 
the source of large ill-gotten galns, the vlolation 
or violations were likely of a seriou.; nature. n 
Given the probable seriousness of the trans- 
gressions, the gravity-based penalt~es arislng 
from an Agency enforcement actlon could great- 
ly outwelgh any economlc benefit gamed 
through the violation. Thls is particularly true 
because the rlsk that the Agency will take an 
enforcement actlon for mlnor vlolat ions IS mln- 
imal, whereas it IS much more likely to Invest 
the tlme and resources to penalize slgnificant 
v~olatlons. Therefore, even withou;: the added 
shleld of privilege or Immunity statutes, compa- 
nles with major violat~ons (or the potentral 
thereof) have the most to galn from the audit 
policy and its concomitant protections.57 
Delineat~ng precisely what constitutes a 
"slgnificant" economlc galn would remove the 
Agencys discretion to differentiate between larg- 
er and smaller entitles that have cornrnitted vrs- 
some statutes, such as FIFRA, it IS unclear whether PEN 
applies). 
55 The QRT 1s comprised of members of each 
malor media enforcement program, as well as the 
Department of Justice and representative!; of each EPA 
reglon. It IS chalred by the Office sf Regulatory 
Enforcement withln the EPA Office sf Regulatory 
Enforcement (OECA). The QRT's stated mission is to 
"expeditiously, fairly, and consistently resolve nationally 
slgnificant Issues lnvolvlng application of the audit policy 
In specific cases." Audit Policy Update (EPA Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance), Jan. 1997 at 9. 
56. EPA has committed itself to conducting a fol- 
low-up study withln three years of the Ist;uance of the 
Final Policy Statement to determine the policy's effective- 
ness. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at 66,706. 
57 Thls 1s prov~ded. of course, that the agency cor- 
rectly assesses the economlc benefit gainej through the 
vlolation. If the EPA incorrectly assesses the benefit, the 
cost to the vlolator could be much higher or lower 
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lations, as well as among the v~olat~ons them- 
selves. A $10,000 v~olat~on m~ght mean nothlng 
to a large oil company, but it would likely matter 
a great deal to a small dry cleaner. The Agency 
currently has discretion to cons~der the ratio of 
the cost of compliance to the envlronmental 
benefivr~sk. Inslstlng that the Agency decree 
exactly what constitutes a s~gnificant amount 
would eliminate its flexibility In lndiv~dual cases, 
while offerlng a benefit of questionable worth. 
Furthermore, if EPA revealed the dollar 
amount at whlch they would initlate enforce- 
ment, that would create a pernlclous reverse 
Incentwe. Entities could break the law with rela- 
tive Impunity as long as the~r transgressions did 
not brlng them the specified amount of econom- 
IC galn. That freedom to lnfract polnts to poor 
strategy by the enforcing Agency. just as the 
police do not publish the number of miles over 
the posted speed limit at whrch they start ticket- 
Ing, so too would a parallel tactic prove counter- 
productive for EPA. It bears noting that though 
the police do not state the~r policy for speeders. 
people know that they will almost never get tick- 
eted for small amounts over the speed limit. 
Similarly, In the envlronmental arena, small vlo- 
lations are de facto tolerated, but the uncertainty 
over when enforcement beglns helps to malntain 
acceptable compliance levels. 
Another problem with specifylng the precise 
amount of the economlc galn that the Agency 
would deem s~gnificant lies in the fact that dolng 
so would come perilously close to a rule rather 
than a policy.58 Setting a specific level of galn and 
specifylng a preclse Agency response does far 
more than merely suggest the policy that the 
58. Sa. e.g.. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 
818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [disallowing FDApolicy defin- 
ing maximum aflatoxin levels In food because the policy 
was couched in mandatory terms and therefore had the 
effect of a rule). 
59. See 'id. at 945-48; U.S. Telephone Ass'n v Fed 
Communications Comm'n. 28 E3d 1232. 1234 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (finding that FCC penalty schedule setting base for- 
feiture amounts for violations "does not fit the paradigm 
of a policy statement"). 
60. Sa Dana, supra note 5, at 978 I%rporatlons 
cannot be assumed to choose the mix of management 
options that maxlmize environmental compliance and 
well-being unless it is In their financial interest to do 
SO."); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell. Cooperation and Constratnt 
Z 
Agency mlght apply In an adjudication. It creates z 
a rule of conduct and sets a mandatory Agency 
response. Consequently. definlng the precise 
B 
I 
Z 
nature of a vtolation and mandating a particular 3 
Agency response would probably requlre a rule- 
making, rather than lust the Issuance of a gu~d- 
ance document-s Since it makes little sense from 
an enforcement standpoint to attach a specific 
dollar figure to '"slgnificant amount." it seems 
wholly ill-adv~sed to force the Agency to lnstlgate 
a rulemaklng on thls Issue. 
The thud compla~nt. that without prlvilegrng 
audit results. entitles performing self-audits 
open themselves up to potentially damaglng tort 
and citizen enforcement suits, demands a more 
r~g~rous Inquiry The predicate of thls critlc~sm 
seems skewed The v~olation, not the self-audit, 
creates grounds for clvil suit. A self-audit merely 
bnngs the v~olation to light In a manner designed 
to mitigate Agency enforcement. 
We must assume that the entity believes that 
the v~olation will eventually come to light even 
without an audit. If  not, the entire argument over 
whether to protect self-audits becomes moot 
because there is no Incentive to perform one.&> If
the regulated entity can v~olate envlronmental 
laws with ~mpunit): then it need not fear Agency 
enforcement or citizen enforcement suts  and 
self-audits become pointless. Rather than audit 
and potentially lose the economic benefits ans- 
Ing from its v~olat~ons. the entity would more 
likely continue to v~olate and thereby also con- 
tinue reaplng the wlndfall profits Stemmlng from 
its m~sconduct " One can also lmaglne a cycle of 
steadily worsening behavior whereby an entity 
v~olates to enormous financ~al galn. commrs- 
m tk Mdtm Co~oral~on An Inquiry into the C a w  of Corporatr 
Imntaralrly, 73 T=G L REJ 477" 479-92 119951 
61 But set ifl"rJlpbons Dmhtd Under lmmunlty Law 
\ir@ufif Hart Eluded Tms, 06Kn7ts Agret* DalIy Envrronment 
Report, April 24, 1996 ldiscussmng how campantes con- 
d u a ~ n g  audlts under shteld of the states new seIf-audit 
law are turning up v~crlattens that woutd have gone unde- 
tected by state regulat~rsl It beans natrng hcwever, that 
state agencies do net have the resources or personneIbf 
the federal EPA V~olations that may have escaped state 
Inspectors may eventually have been caught at the feder- 
al level Or. the v~olattons mtght eventlraIIy have led to an 
illegal andror harmful release that would have rncuned 
not lust the wrath of the Agenc): but a rash of atizen s ~ i t s  
as well 
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slons an audit to galn ~mmunity for its past 
act~ons, and then beg~ns the cycle again, t h ~ s  
t ~ m e  v~olat~ng different laws. 
Regulated entitles uncerta~n about wheth- 
er they are comply~ng with env~ronmental aws 
must choose between two difficult alternatives: 
( 1 )  gamble that EPA will not discover the v~ola- 
tron independently and Impose the full brunt 
of the available economlc and possibly cnml- 
nal penalt~es; or (2) conduct a self-audit, dis- 
close any v~olatlons, and reach a settlement 
with the Agency. Thls course of actlon would 
reduce economic penaltles62 and likely remove 
the threat of crlmlnal prosecution as well.63 
Once the vlolat~on stands revealed, the 
v~olator may find itself the target of prlvate c~vil 
suits. Yet, to structure the audit policy so as to 
sh~eld v~olators from c~vil suits by grant~ng 
lmmunity to and/or pr~vileglng the results of 
audits,64 seems counter to EPA's mandate to 
protect the public and the env1ronment.65, For 
an entity to complaln that the federal enforce- 
ment policy fails to sh~eld it from the com- 
pla~nts of Injured parties (in tort suits) seems 
ak~n to a cr~m~nal grouslng because h ~ s  plea 
barga~n does not protect him from clvil suits. 
The fear that report~ng audit results will 
expose entitles to civil suit also seems over- 
stated. Since tort suits requlre significant 
harm, anyone who had experienced such harm 
would undoubtedly seek to learn its cause and 
would have a great deal of ~nformat~on at her 
disposal.66 Furthermore, prompt report~ng and 
correct~on of a vrolat~on would go far towards 
mitlgatlng c~vil liability by elimlnatlng the 
62. See Sorenson, supra note 29 at 489. 
63. See Audit Policy Update (EPA Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance), January 1997, 
at 3 (noting that the declston not to charge at least three 
companies with env~ronmental crlrnes arlslng from thelr 
voluntary disclosure of v~olations, "stemmed from the 
cons~derations expressly set forth In the Audit Policy."). 
64, See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at 
66,710 [outlining EPA's opposition to state laws that pnv- 
ilege the results of env~ronmental audits). 
65. See, e.g., rd. (purpose of the policy IS to "enhance 
protection of human health and the environment by 
encouraglng regulated entities to voluntarily discover, 
disclose, correct and prevent v~olations of federal envl- 
ronmental requ~rements"). 
polnt source of any contam~natlon before it 
causes harm or, at a mlnlmum, hefore it caus- 
es further harm. 
Also, a recent Supreme Courl: declslon has 
effect~vely elim~nated standing for citlzen 
enforcement suits In cases where the govern- 
ment has taken an enforcement actton." The 
Court held that neither vlndicat~on of the rule 
of law without cogn~zable Injury, nor past ille- 
gal conduct, nor the unsubstantiated threat of 
future Injury, sat~sfy the redressability requlre- 
ment for Art~cle I l l  standing.@ 
Citlzen enforcement suits rout~nely seek to 
penalize wrongdoers by seeklng sratutory dam- 
ages. A successful citlzen suit therefore swells 
the coffers of the federal treasury more than it 
benefits the citlzen lit~gant(s). The Court's clar- 
ificat~on of the redressability standard eliml- 
nates standing In these 1nstances.69 
Further, the illegal conduct presumably 
ceases once an Agency enforcement actton 
occurs. If so, there 1s no present or loom~ng 
future Injury and therefore no standing.?" 
Requlrlng that an entity disgorge the econom- 
IC benefit gamed through noncompliance (as 
mandated by the audit policy) constitutes an 
Agency enforcement actlon. Cor~sequently, i f  
an entity self-audits, discloses the results, 
remedies the discovered vlolatlons, and then 
pays the penalty mandated by the Agency, it 
galns a sh~eld from citlzen suits. The Court's 
clarification of the redressability standard ' 
elim~nates tanding In these 1nstances.71 
An lnterest~ng situation may arise when 
the economlc benefit from a v~olatlon IS ~nsuf- 
66. See. e.g.. the TOXIC Release lnvenfory, available 
online at, (last modified Mar. 31. 1998) <www.epa.gov/ 
env~ro/htrnl/tr~s/ tns-query-lava html, as well as the Infor- 
mation that would normally become available through 
clvil discovery. 
67 See. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 1998 WL 8804 ( U S  111) at 
13-14 (1998) ("It 1s an Immense and unacceptable stretch 
to call the presumption [of future injury1 Into service as a 
substitute for the allegation of present or threatened 
Injury upon whlch Initial standing must be based~") 
68. See rd. 
69. See rd. 
70. See rd. 
71. See rd. 
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fic~ently large to merit an enforcement actlon. 
Following an audit, a company m~ght wlsh to 
enter Into a settlement agreement with EPA, 
despite the Agencys apparent lack of Interest, 
in order to defuse the r~sk of a citizen suit. The 
Agency enforcement action would actually 
work to the polluter's benefit by quashing the 
deterrent power of a potent~al citlzen enforce- 
ment suit. 
Even assuming that the government 
should lessen the potential liability of entities 
that disclose and correct v~olat~ons through 
self-audits, the incentives offered In the Final 
Policy Statement do just that. In addit~on to 
the protection from cit~zen enforcement suits 
gained vla Agency enforcement actlons, the 
Agency's mit~gated response to v~olat~ons dis- 
covered through voluntary audits72 encourages 
lndustr~es to periodically scrutinize the~r 
behavlor. That scrutlny enables prompt discov- 
ery and remediatlon of current violat~ons as 
well as the avoidance of potent~al future prob- 
lems. Entitles can self-correct before the~r 
actlons injure the public, thereby heading off 
possible tort suits as well as creat~ng a climate 
of good will among the citlzenry.73 
Lastly. concern about confident~ality does 
not appear to play much of a role in Industry 
decisions concerning self-audits.74 The 
absence of protect~on from thlrd party suits 
has not deterred Industry from self-audit~ng. A 
1995 Price Waterhouse survey found that. 
among the few large or m~d-s~zed companies 
that have elected not to self-audit, concern 
about confident~ality was not a s~gnificant fac- 
tor In the~r declslon.75 Their reasons were pn- 
marily economic. 
72. Final Policy Statement. supra note 2, at 66,706 
(summanzing incentives to self-audit). 
73. Compare Gail S. Port, Does EPA Policy Ml/y Provide 
Protection? NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, June 12. 1995 (public 
interest groups that are unsatisfied with agency response 
or the efforts to remedy the v~olation may still elect to 
sue. even after a company has voluntarily disclosed and 
attempted to correct a vtolation). Suits can only be filed, 
however. if the company's efforts to correct the problem 
have failed. 
74. See Testimony of Steven Herman, supra note 8, 
("[Slu~eys on audit practices and our discussions with 
Z 
111. Privileges and Immunities x 
As mentioned above, despite EPKs efforts 
B 
I 
to fash~on the Final Policy Statement to meet 2 1 
state concerns. many states remaln unsat~sfied 
with the federal audit policy. Eighteen states 
have passed laws grantlng vanous levels of evl- 
dentlary privilege to audit reports as well as In 
some cases. allowlng immunity for the v~olator. 
State audit statutes fall generally into two cate- 
gories. (1) statutes offerlng a qualified pr~vitege 
and no Immunity (most state statutes fall into 
thls categoryj, and (2) statutes offering both a 
qualified pr~vilege and 1mmunity76 Thls section 
lo~ks at the legal and policy reasoning behlnd 
an ev~dentiary pr~vilege and immunity. 
A. Privilege 
Legislatures. both at the state and federal 
level, can create new pr~vileges through statute. 
For the most part, however. Congress and the 
state legislatures have been chary of shielding 
Information from the ludicla1 and admln~strative 
process that the courts have not already shreid- 
ed through common law ev~dentiary privilege. 
According to Wigmore, four condit~ons must be 
met In order to lustify a ludicla1 privilege; 
1 The communlcat~ons must or1g1- 
nate In a confidence that they they will not 
be disclosed 
2. Thls element of confidentiality must be 
essential to the full and satisfactory main- 
tenance of the relation between the par- 
ttes. 
3. The relation must be one whlch ln the 
oplnlon of the community ought to be 
sedulously fatertd. 
stakeholders connnced us that any 'chilling effect' that 
our enforcement pitctes had on self-audit~ng has been 
more than offset by exrsttng Incentives to have a cornpre- 
hens~ve audttlng program "1 
75 Sn Vofunlary Enuronmenla! Ault Survey of U S 
Business, Pnce Waterhouse LLP (March 1W5j at 47 [here- 
Inafter 'Price Waterhouse Survey'!, sst a h  Rna! Poliq 
Statement. supra nQte 2, at 66.710 fclttng survey as eii- 
dence In apposltlon to state laws giantrng pr~vrIege or 
~mmunityl 
76 SPr Sorenson, supra nate 29, at 491 
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0 4. The injury that would Inure to the 
I relat~on by the disclosure of the com- munlcatlon must be greater than the bene- 
3 fit thereby gamed for the correct dispos- 
al of the lit1gat1on.77 
In declding whether to extend a privilege, 
courts must balance the competing policy con- 
slderatlons of complete disclosure of relevant 
facts and the public Interest In malntalnlng the 
confidentiality of certaln communlcat~ons. In 
general, courts have shown a marked reluc- 
tance to create new pr1vileges.~8 There currently 
exlst three ev~dentlary precedents for pnvileg- 
lng the results of audits: attorney-client prlvl- 
lege, self-critlcal analysis, and the work product 
doctrine. As several commentators have shown, 
none of these extant doctrines comfortably 
encompass a proposed audit prlvilege.79 
B. Immunity 
Several state self-audit laws prov~de both 
clvil and cr~m~nal Immunity to companies that 
disclose v~olatlons In accordance with state 
gu1delines.80 Without ~mmunity, even if  the 
evaluative lnformat~on of an audit were pr1v1- 
leged, government lnvestlgators could use dis- 
covery to gain access to the factual lnformatlon 
contamed In the audit. Cons~der the Arkansas 
prlvilege statute, if a state pollut~on control 
Agency has Independent lnformatlon glvlng it 
probable cause to believe an env~ronmental 
offens has been committed, it can obtaln a 
copy of an audit report. (1)  under a search war- 
rant, (2) under a subpoena; or (3) through dis- 
77 Wigmore. Ev~dence. 2285 (McNaughten rev. 
196 1 ) (emphas~s In or~g~nal). 
78. See Un~versity of Pennsylvan~a v. EEOC. 493 U.S. 
182, 189 (1990) (acknowledging that, while the Federal 
Rules of Ev~dence "prov~de the courts with flexibility to 
develop rules of prlvilege on a case-by-case basts, we 
are dis~nclined to exerclse thls authority expans~vely"). 
79. See Hunt & Wilk~ns, supra note 23, at 377-402; 
Sorenson, supra note 29. at 490-500. 
80. Those states are: Idaho, 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws. 
359; Kansas, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 204; Minnesota, 1995 
Minn. Laws 168; Texas, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 219; Virg~n~a, 
Va. Code Ann. Q 10.1-1 198 (1995); and Wyom~ng, Wyo. 
Stat. QQ 35-1 1-1 105. 1106 (Mitchle 1998). It bears noting, 
however, that Idaho's law sunsets In 1998 and the gover- 
nor has recently agreed not to seek its renewal. Telephone 
covery.81 If the Agency uncovers evldence of a 
v~olatlon it can seek penalt~es. 
By contrast, Immunity statutes provide 
auditlng entitles with complete protection from 
penalty. For example, Wyornlng's statute states, 
"If an owner or operator of a facility regulated 
under thls act voluntarily reports tc the depart- 
ment a vlolat~on disclosed by the audit the 
department shall not seek c~vil penalties or 
~njunctlve relief for the v~olat~on reported "82 
The law goes on to list four caveats, excluding 
from Immunity vlolat~ons where: 
i) the facility IS under ~nvest~gatlon for 
any v~olat~on of thls act at the time the 
vlolat~on IS reported; 
( i i )  the owner or operator does not take 
actlon to eliminate the v~olat~on withln 
the tlme frame specified In an order 
affirmed by the council or otherwise 
made final pursuant to W.S. 35-1 1- 
701 (c)(ii); 
( i i i )  the v~olat~on IS the result of gross 
negligence or recklessness; or 
(iv) the department has assurrled prl- 
macy over a federally delegated envl- 
ronmental law and a warver of penalty 
authority would result In a st;'te pro- 
gram less str~ngent than the federal 
program or the walver would v~olate 
any federal rule or regulat~on requrred 
to malntaln state prlmacy.83 
Other state laws vary In language and s~ope ,~4  
but all offer some form of Immunity from civil 
l n t e ~ ~ e w  with Br~an Riedel, U.S EPA, Vice Char (Office of 
Plann~ng and Policy Analys~s), Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance & Editor, EPA Audit Policy Update (April 5 
1997) lhere~nafter Riedel In t e~~ewl ,  In adclition, BPA is 
currently negotiating with Texas to remove the criminal 
Immunity provlslon from its audit law Id. 
81. See ARK. CODE ANN. Q 8-1-309(a) (Ivlitchie 1907) 
(proceeding to obta~n env~ronmental audit leport) 
82. WYO. STAT. ANN. 4 35-1 1-1 106 (a) (PAitchie 1997). 
83. Id. 
84. Minnesota's law, for example, institutes a pilot 
program forvoluntary compliance. Participation is limited 
to regulated entities that have not been the subiect of an 
enforcement action resulting In a penalty for at least one 
year prevlous to the~r enrollment. See 1995 Mlnn. Law 168 
§§ 8. 10. 
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and/or cr~mlnal prosecut~on to companies that 
disclose v~olat~ons In compliance with the 
statutory gu~delines. 
Grantlng statutory Immunity to entitles 
that voluntarily disclose v~olat~ons ralses many 
s~milar policy Issues to audit prlvilege. 
Immunity allows polluters to benefit from the~r 
mlsdeeds without fear of prosecut1on.85 while 
creatlng the potentla1 for uneven enforce- 
ment.86 In a state with a prlvilege and rmmunl- 
ty reglme an entity could disclose and remedy 
only one of the several v~olat~ons it discovered 
durlng an audit. It would galn Immunity from 
any penalty for that v~olation while keeplng the 
rest of the audit lnformat~on privileged. In thls 
way the entity would look like a good corporate 
cit~zen while contlnulng to reap the benefits of 
its remalnlng vlolat~ons. By contrast, an entity 
In a state without a pr~vilege andlor Immunity 
statute would have to disclose the full results 
of any audits and face any penalt~es arlslng 
from all the v~olat~ons discovered durlng the 
audit process. 
Further, by maklng it more attractive to cor- 
rect noncompliance, audit Immunity dimin~sh- 
es corporate lncentlve to prevznt noncompli- 
ance In the first place.87 Since corporat~ons 
earn a return on all current assets, they would 
clearly prefer to defer low-return expenditures 
like pollut~on technology for as long as possl- 
ble. Without Immunity, a company cons~derlng 
delaylng its Investment In pollut~on control 
technology must we~gh: (1) the rlsk of substan- 
t ~ a l  economrc and gravity-based penalties if  it 
gets caught, and (2) the costs of disgorging its 
economlc galns and Installing new technology 
at potent~ally h~gber prices (if it audits and dis- 
closes the v~olat~on with the Intent of remedy- 
lng the problem). 
Z 
Compan~es restding In states with Immunl- 2 
ty statutes no longer need worry about relin- 
qulshlng the economlc benefits gamed 
ii 
P 
2 
I 
Y through noncompliance. They must only -
assess the odds ~f gettlng caught before con- 
ducting an audit against the substant~al wind- 
fall they stand to reap through noncompliance 
coupled with the Immunity they stand to gain 
through the~r eventual audit Assurnlng the 
ex~stence of an immunity statute and given the 
dwindling government resources devoted to 
environmental enforcement. engagtng In a 
cycle of vl~latlon and compiiance audits rather 
than invest~ng In prevention appears to make 
good economlc sense.@ Given thrs counterpro- 
ductive effect on pollution control, the adurs- 
ability of ~mmunity statutes bears serlous 
reevaluation.s2 
N. Is EPA Policy on Self-Audits A Rule in 
DIsgufse? 
One of the malor complarnts leveled by 
Industry at EPKs audit policy was that it rs 
actually a disguised rule that should have 
undergone an APA rulemaking procedurel"' 
According to critics. the audit policy delineates 
the Agency's enforcement response to envlrnrn- 
mental v~olat~ons with such certarnty that it 
should be sublect to a rulemak~ng as required 
by the APAq1 
Thls section examlnes the differences 
behveen polic~es and rules under the APA, and 
as Interpreted by the courts It then analyzes the 
audit policy to determine whether lt should 
have been Issued as a mPe The anakysls con- 
cludes by finding the audit poiicy a valid state- 
ment of policy. not In need of an APA rulemak- 
1% 
85. See Testimony of Steven Herman, supra note 8 87 Set Dana, supra note 5, at 979-91 
TestiFylng agalnst a proposed ~rnrnunity provlslon at the 
federal level. Herman noted that 'the penalty lrnmunity 
provlslon m the bill glves v~olators an economlc advan- 
tage over the~r law-ab~ding competitors. lTlo maintam 
a level playlng field. the federal and state governments 
must be able to recoup the economlc benefit of vlola- 
tions--even Inadvertent ones that are discovered volun- 
tarily." Id. 
86. See Intenrn Policy Statement. suprir note I. at 
16.878. 
88 Set ~d far a full ~ISCUSSIOII ~f t h e  ec~~nomlcs of 
prevention. tnactton, or aud~trng under an ~mrnunir; 
framework 
89 3 r d  
90 Set Rtedel I n t e ~ i e ~ ,  supra n 3 t e  ?(s ldiscuisirrg 
the feedbackcolleded by the agencj dunng the csmrn5nt  
period eitxeen pubitcatten at t h e  Interim and F i n d  
Pallc,l Staternentsj. sa a h  Ftnal PoIry Statement, rurm 
note 2, at 66,7113 
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A. Rules vs. Policy Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Rules are Agency-made laws.92 Agencles 
cannot pass rules unless author~zed by statute. 
But, so long as a rule does not exceed the 
Agency's statutory authority (including the 
APA), it IS enforceable as law. Further, unlike the 
leglslat~ve brapch of the government, agencles 
are not constrained by the separation of powers 
doctrine. Withln the limits of the~r mandate, the 
APA, and due process, agencies make, enforce, 
and adjudicate laws.93 Because agencles wleld 
such power, the APA requlres that Agency-made 
rules undergo a revlew process, including pub- 
lishlng the proposed rule In the Federal 
Reg~ster?~ lnvitlng public comment,g5 compos- 
Ing a mandatory Agency response to those com- 
ments,96 and allowing the opportunity for judi- 
c~al rev1ew.97 Policies, on the other hand, do not 
formally bind agencles or regulated entitles and 
therefore requlre no formal revlew process. 
Consequently, In matters where the Agency 
wishes to allow both itself and its constituents 
latitude, polic~es can prove more efficient and 
expedient than rules. 
Policies suggest the positlon the Agency 
will likely take In an adjudication. Rather than 
promulgat~ng specific rules of conduct, policles 
explaln the likely reactlon of the Agency to cer- 
tam behavior. They are meant to gulde both the 
Agency and its constituents In determ~nlng how 
the Agency will likely respond to certaln behav- 
lor. Rules serve a slmilar fundlon; they do not 
lock the Agency Into an enforcement strategy 
slnce any such actlons are taken at the discre- 
tlon of the Agency. However, a rule would estab- 
lish a b~nding set of criterla that must be met 
before ~nitlatlng enforcement. The decislon 
92. See Immigration and Naturalization Sew. v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (acknowledging that agency- 
made rules are laws enforceable in the same manner as 
those made by Congress). 
93 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. G William T. Mayton, 
Administrative Law. Q 4.1 ( 1993). 
94. See 5 U.S.C. Q 553(b) (1994). 
95 See 5 U.S.C. Q 553(c) (1994). 
96 See ld. 
97 See 5 U.S.C. Q 553 (1994); see also Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC. 435 U.S. 519 541-50 
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whether to enforce, if the critc?rta are met, 
belongs to the Agency.g8 But the criteria, once 
promulgated In a rule, elim~nate much of the 
flexibility that would be available under a policy. 
Because they do not legally blnd the 
Agency or its regulated entitles, policies are 
not subject to judicial revlew, The flexibility 
offered by a policy may somettnies outwelgh 
the increased force of law that Inheres In a rule. 
The rulemaklng process may seem overly bur- 
densome, and the constraints of a formal rule 
may Inhibit the Agencys responsiveness. In 
additron, the Agency may not feel entlrely 
secure with its policy, and may wlsh to avoid 
the scrutlny that accompan~es a formal rule- 
maklng.99 
Since agencles control actlvit~es and dis- 
pense items of great value (e.g., licenses, food 
stamps, health care), a statement of the 
Agencys positlon on a glven Issue can have a 
profound Impact upon regulated entitles. 
Those who cannot afford to displease the enti- 
ty that controls thelr livelihood will likely 
change thelr behavlor to meet Agency guide- 
lines. Consequently, In practice, the line 
between a rule, whlch mandates c3rtaln behav- 
lor, and a policy, wh~ch "suggests" behavtor 
while relying on the threat of Agency actlon for 
emphas~s, can become quite blurr.ed.ioo 
Indeed, a key reason that agencies often 
prefer policles IS that the confus~on over how 
to distinguish a policy from a rule has led to 
considerable judic~al deference for Agency 
actions. Polic~es currently recelve the deferen- 
t ~ a l  "arbitrary and capr~clous" standard of 
revlew that courts once reserved for leglslat~ve 
rules.~0~ Th~s allows agencles.to make b~nding 
pronouncements without subject~ng those pro- 
(1978) (establishing procedural requirements for rule- 
making; agencies may, at their discretiorl, impose addl- 
tional requirements, but the courts may not do so] 
98. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S EZ1.831 (1985). 
99. See Aman G Mayton. supra note 03, at 3 4 0. 
100. See id at Q 4 2.2; see also Robert A Anthony, 
"Interpretive" Rilles, "Legalalive" Rules and 'Spurious" Rulrs. 
Lilting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L I. AM U. I .  9, (!specially n 29 
(1994) (analyzing and classifying the binding effects of 
various agency documents) 
101. See APA. 5 U.S C. Q 706(2) (1994) ('The revlew- 
ing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency 
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nouncements to the scrutiny of a rulemaking.102 
Free from the pressure that the public and 
industry can brlng to bear, an Agency can effec- 
tively operate by fiat rather than with the over- 
sight mandated by the APA.103 
In a number of cases, the courts have found 
that policy statements by agencies amounted 
to rules in disguise.104 At other times they have 
upheld the Agency's policy guidelines as appro- 
priate. In Iowa power & Lrght Co. v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc.,lo5 for example, the Eighth Circuit 
held that the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion's (ICC) practlce of determining the reason- 
ableness of the contracts between railroads and 
shippers on a case-by-case basis amounted to 
a policy rather than a rule. The railroads had 
claimed that the policy bound the Agency to a 
specific code of behavlor and should therefore 
have been set down for a rulemaking. The court 
disagreed, finding that the policy did not estab- 
lish a binding- legal norm for all contractual 
arrangements. Instead, it left the Agency free to 
"exercise considerable discretion" when evalu- 
action, findings and conclus~ons found to be arbitraw 
capnclous, an abuse of discretion "). Id. Courts have 
also applied thls standard to policy statements; set, e.g , 
Bechtel v. FCC. 10 E3d 875. 877 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Capital 
Network Sys. v. FCC. 3 E3d 1526, 1530 [D.C. Cir. 19931; 
Amencan Trudung Ass'n v. United States. 755 F.2d 1292, 
1299 (7th Cir. 1985). 
102. See Richard I. Pierce, lr., Sewn \Vays to Dsssify 
Agency Rulemaking. ~ ~ A D M I N .  L. REV. 59 [1995) (argu~ng that 
courts accord greater deference to policy statements and 
Interpretative rules than to leg~slative rules and that pol- 
rcy statements often blnd judges to the same extent as do 
rules). Professor Pierce analyzes Stinson v. United States. 
508 U.S. 36 (1993) and Williams v. United States, 503 U S 
193 (1992). both of which lnvolved Interpretive rules 
rather than policy statements. Though Professor Pierce's 
analysls seems to conflate Interpretive rules and policy 
statements, he IS correct In obse~ lng  that the Court 
seems to merge the two as well. He uses the aforemen- 
tioned declslons to demonstrate how the Court has man- 
dated significant ludicla1 deference to both policres and 
rnterpretive rules. In Stimon. for example. whlch rev~ewed 
Sentenung Comm~ss~on leg~slatlve documents rather 
than policy statements. the Court declared that [tlhe 
pnnc~ple that the Guidelines Manual 1s blnding on feder- 
al courts applies as well to policy statements." SIin:on, 508 
U.S. at 42. 
103. See Robert A Anthony & Davld h Codevilla, 
Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at Agmcy Pdicy SLaI~ntslls, 3I 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667.669 (1996). 
104. See, e.g.. Columbla Broadcasting Sys. v. United 
8 
z ating individual cases,PM Rather than setting 
down the substance of Agency determinations. Z 
the policy instead referred t o  the form by wh~ch 2 
1 
m those determinations would be made. The * 
court found that form without substance did 
not amount to a rule. and therefore did not war- 
rant the railroad's participation in its formula- 
tion 1G7 
The D C. Circuit used similar reasoning rn 
National Latino Media Coalition v Federal Communi- 
cations Commlrnon.1C*The FCC released a written 
announcement stating that it mntended to  can- 
duct a lottery to determine whlch of the many 
equally qualified applicants would receive an 
FCC license The court concluded that the 
announcement was a policy rather than a rule, 
stating: 'These statements merely present an 
interpretation of the Agency s governing 
statute. They d~ not bind the Commrssron ever 
to conduct a tie-breaker Iottery.""'i 
States, 316 U S 407 (1442) In this farnaws"C6S case th2  
Supreme Court held that the FCC s announced disfavor csf 
certaln contractual relatronshrps GeP~een Is,zaI and net- 
work radio statrons amounted to a poIrc; rather than a 
rule. United States Tel Ass n v Federal Communlcattona 
Comm'n. 28 F3d 1232 (DC Crr D994j (penaItj schedule 
promulgated by FCC ameunted t~ a 'ruk rn masquerade 
and was therefore subiect fs a fomnl ruiernak~ngi 
Chamber af C~rnmerce v QSHA 636 F26 46-4 ID C Clr 
19801 lOSHRs announcement that ernp!qers fa~lrrre to 
pay empfoyees br ssc;mpaw;rng agsnq Inspector on 
'walkaraund mspearons l ~ ~ ~ [ J  he proserured as 613- 
cnmlnatron amounted to a m!e an2 must therefore 
undergo a formal mlem3ksngj 
105 Set Isxa Prxer G Ltght CQ ", Burirngtisn 
Nsrthern. Ins &rJ7 F2d 7% 18th Crr lo81 r itrt dtnrtd. 455 
U S 907 W 19824 
I07 SPt td Far a g53d ~ C S C U S S F D R  of tbls case as 
well a s  the p@ltcyCruIe drrhatamg. see. Wlllfarn T Maytors 
The Concept cf a Ruk a d  the ,SuE;tan!wf [rnpJst TtTt m 
Rufemnkrng 33 Eg':::;, L I 889. 918 11984fl 
108 Natron~l Latrns ?.!eJ13 Canlltrcm v Federal 
Cornmunlcstrons Comm n. $16 F2d 185 IDC C!r 19871 
109 Set ~d at 787 
118 Id at 789 For further drsussctn af thrs an5 
related cases see Paul N Rechenberg Note king Tk 
B3llte On Obxenrly. But Cun lVe  Ufln Tht Uru@ The NatronaI 
Bdmment For The A& Frgf~l Agclrmt Fundrng 06;cene Arttitli 
\ifffrkr. 57 h!C!a RE5 299 31 1 119921 
- - 
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B. Tests for Determining Whether a Policy IS 
Actually a Rule 
THO tests have emerged for determlnlng 
whether an Agency dictate amounts to a policy 
or a rule: the "Force of Law" test and the 
"Substant~al Impact" test."' The Force of Law 
test looks at the legal Impact of the Agency 
act~on. Under thls test, the policy statement 
has the force of law if both the Agency and its 
regulated entitles behave as if the Agency 
requlres adherence to its stated posit~on. If so, 
the policy IS actually a disgu~sed rule.and sub- 
lect to a rulemak1ng.1'2 The Substantial Impact 
test IS less formalist. It looks to whether the 
Agency actlon causes "palpable effects" to reg- 
ulated entities and the general public. If so, 
then the actron must undergo the scrutlny and 
public comment that accompanles a rulemak- 
lng procedure.113 Under either test, the audit 
policy does not qualify as a rule. 
1 Force of Law Test 
The Force of Law test has two prerequl- 
sites. First, Congress must formally grant a 
rulemaklng power to an Agency.lI4 Rulemaklng 
power accompanles any delegation of substan- 
tlve power by Congress to an Agency, although 
the parameters of the rulemaklng power may 
vary from statute to statute.l15 For example, 
Congress may delegate authority to EPA to 
enforce the Clean Air Act but reserve for itself 
the r~ght o determine emlsslons standards for 
carbon monox~de for new cars. Whereas, In the 
Clean Water Act, Congress may glve EPA full 
authority to set effluent quality standards In 
every area. 
Second, the proposed rule must derlve its 
authority from the statute that the Agency IS 
~mplementlng. To show an illegal act by a reg- 
ulated entity, the Agency need only show a VIO- 
lat~on of the rule, rather than a v~olat~on f the 
statute. In other words, statutes lay out broad 
I l I .  See Aman & Mayton, supra note 93, a t  Q 4.3. 
112. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co, v. Federal 
Power Comm'n, 506 E2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
113. See National Helium Corp. v. Federal Energy 
Admln.. 569 E2d 1137 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977). 
114. See, e.g.. Amerlcan Postal Workers U n ~ o n  v. 
parameters and goals, instruct~ng agencles to 
adopt rules which then f i l l  in the gaps, specify- 
lng wh~ch behav~or does and does not conform 
with the law. Reasonrng syllog~st~cally, if a rule 
specifies how to obey a law, and an entity v~o- 
lates the rule, then the entity must have vlolat- 
ed the law as well. 
The leading case for the I:orce of Law 
approach IS Pacific Gas & Electnc Co v. Ft9deral 
Power Commaslon.~6 In upholdirrg the Power 
Comm~ss~on's u e of a policy statement rather ' 
than a rule to announce its methodology for 
curtailing natural gas usage durrng times of 
shortage, the D.C. Circuit found that the 
Comm~ss~on had merely announced the policy 
it would use In subsequent adjudicat~crns, 
rather than creating a blanket rule The apln~on 
la~d out the difference between :I policy and a 
rule as follows: 
In adrn~n~strative proceedings 
lnvolvlng a substantwe rule, !:he Issues 
are whether the adjudicated facts con- 
form to the rule and whether the rule 
should be wa~ved or ppplied In that 
particular Instance. 
* * *  
A general statement of policy on the 
other hand, does not establish a "blnd- 
lng norm." [Tlhe Agency cannot 
apply or rely on a general statement of 
policy as law. IWlhen the Agency 
applies the policy In a particular situa- 
tlon, it must be prepared to support 
the policy lust as if the policy state- 
ment had never been 1ssued.~l7 
Though the Power Comm~s.s~on's policy 
effect~vely forced many natural gas users to 
begln an immediate search for alternative 
energy sources, the court nonetheless found 
that, slnce the dec~s~on had been Issued as a 
United States Postal Serv 707 E2d 543, 558 (DC Clr 
1983). cert. denred. 465 U S. 1 100 ( 1984) 
115. SeeMortonv.Rulz.415US 109 231 (1974) 
116. See Pacific Gas & Elec Co v Federal Power 
Comm'n. 506 E2d 33 (D C. Cir 1974). 
1 17. Id a t  38-39. 
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policy statement, it lacked the "force of law""8 
and therefore could not possibly have been 
enforced as such. The tautology embedded In 
thls reasoning (a policy cannot have the force of 
a rule because policles lack the force of rules) 
has not been lost on the courts, including the 
D.C. Circuit in later decls1ons.fl9 While no brnd- 
ing precedent exists dictating the proper test for 
determlning whether a policy is In fact a rule In 
disguise, recent years have witnessed a drift 
away from the Force of Law test and toward the 
Substantral Effects test.120 
2. Applying the Force of Law Test fo the 
Audit Policy 
Though courts have applied the Force of 
Law test less frequently in recent years, the test 
has not been categorically discarded. Further- 
more, there remarns no consensus as to the 
best method for distlngu~shing rules from poli- 
aes. It will therefore prove instructive for both 
legal and analytrcal reasons to apply the test to 
the federal audit policy. 
A rule dictates behavior, either of the regu- 
lated entity or the regulating Agency. By con- 
trast, a policy offers guidance while binding ner- 
ther s~de. The key determrnatlve factors In the 
Force of Law test involve whether: (1) the policy 
statement establishes a "blnding norm;"i*1 and 
(2) whether the Agency relies on the policy as a 
general statement of la\v.lu Then, to qualify as 
a policy rather than a rule, the Agency must (3) 
"be prepared to support the policy just as if the 
policy statement had never been issued."~23 
1 18. See id. at 4 1. 
119. See. e.g.. Community Nutrition lnst v. l'oung, 
818 E2d 943, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("IAlction levels' estab- 
lished by the FDA for contamfnants In food amounted to 
a rule rather than policy because the agency guidelines 
'set a preclse level of contamination that the FDA 
deems perrnlssible."). 
120. See Aman & Mayton, supril note 93, at Q 4 3 
(noting that slnce the early seventies, courts have begun 
to turn away from the "facile semantic distlnct~ons- of the 
force of law approach). 
121. See Pacific Gas & Elec Co. v. Federal Power 
Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33. 49 [D.C. Cir. 1974); sc2 aka United 
States Telephone v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 28 
F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
122. See Pacific Gas & Elec Co. v. Federal Power 
Comm'n. 506 E2d 33.49 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
Z 
it seems doubtful that the audit policy cre- z 
ates a blnding norm. The text of the Final Policy 
Statement expressly declines to blnd affected 
8 
= 
€ 
parties.1z4 though it does spell out with some I m 
-I 
specificity the partrcular procedures for volun- 
tary disclosure of environmental v~olations in 
order to lessen the Agency's enforcement 
resp0nse.12~ Nonetheless, neither the Final 
Policy Statement nor the lnter~m Policy 
demands specific behavlor from regulated entt- 
ties, The declsron to self-audit IS entlrely volun- 
tary. Thls poses a stark contrast to the exampIes 
offered by Professor Anthony wherein the 
Agency attempted to use policy statements to 
dictate the behawor of regulated enttt1es.r26 
The audit policy also leaves room for 
Agency discret~on As noted earlier, EPA can 
decline to seek restrtution depending on the 
amount of economlc benefit der~ved from a par- 
tlcular vrolat~on "' It thus remains an open 
questlon as to whether the policy creates a 
"binding norm" even with respect to Agency 
behavr~r. 
Some critics and state legislatures contend 
that the audit policy blnds states, preventing 
them from uslng therr own methods for envr- 
ronmental enforcement. They pcrlnt to the 
Agency's stated opposition to state laws granti- 
ng privilege and Immunrty to violators 12% They 
reason that if the Agency can threaten to disap- 
prove a State implementatron Plan (SIPj for 
enforcrng federal environmental law by ailegrng 
~ncompatibility with the audit policy. then the 
audit policy must have the force of law. Th~s 
123 11 
124 Flnal P s l t g  Statement suprrl nzte 2 at 66 712 
[The po11c-y is not a frnsl agenzy 'ictrsrr and 1s rntended 
as guidance It d s e s  m2a create any rights dutres oblrga- 
tlons or defenses trnpfred or atherktse in an) thrrd par- 
ties ' j 
125 SPt Ftnad Partg Staternen! supril note 2 at 
66,711 and accamp3nyrng text 
126 Spr Cammunay Nutrition fnsl v Young 818 
F2d 943 ID  C Cmr 1981) 
127 F~nal PaEtg Statement supra ngte 2 at 64 707 
128 Ftnal Palre; Statement supra note 2 at 66 7E2 
("EPA remains f~mly oppssed to statutoty environrnentai 
audlt pr~vrleges that sh~efd e-rrcfence af environmental 
*~~olations as well as to 61anket rrnmuntties far vroIa- 
tmns I 
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argument has merit, but close exam~natlon 
reveals that the Final Policy Statement leaves 
cons~derable room for state statutory discre- 
tlon. 
EPA has not objected to the majority of 
state statutes that allow some form of prlvl- 
lege and/or Immunity, and In other cases has 
merely asked for clarification from the states' 
attorneys general.l29Addit1onally, if the test for 
determining whether a policy IS actually a cam- 
ouflaged rule lies In whether the Agency can 
"support the policy lust as if the policy state- 
ment had never been 1ssued,"l30 then one 
could convlnc~ngly argue that it IS not the 
audit policy but the federal statutes them- 
selves that vo~d state laws that Impede 
enforcement. EPA need not rely on the audit 
policy to nullify a SIP Indeed, slnce the audit 
policy IS not a rule, it lacks the statutory 
authority to do so. To vo~d a SIP, the Agency 
must show that a particular state law creat~ng 
an ev~dent~ary privilege and/or Immunity for 
v~olators Interferes with the effic~ent enforce- 
ment of federal law. 
The audit policy sat~sfies the second prong 
of the analysls In that EPA relies on it as a 
statement of law. The policy outlines the 
Agency's response to v~olat~ons discovered 
through self-audits131 and the Agency acknowl- 
edges that the policy sets "mln~rnum statutory 
gu1delines."l32 As one Agency offic~al noted, 
"Practically speaking, we're applylng it like a 
rule."l33 
Regarding the thlrd quest~on, whether EPA 
can, when enforcing the policy, support it just 
as if  the policy statement had never been 
issued, the answer appears to be yes. Since the 
policy blnds no one but EPA, the Agency need 
only justify its own actlons. The actlons at 
129. See State Immunity, Privilege Laws Examwed for 
Conflicts Affecting Delegated Programs. DAILY ENVIRONMENT 
REPORT, Sep. 18, 1996, availa6le a LEXIS, BNA Library, 
BNAED file (finding that "most states with audit laws are 
faclng no threat to the~r  federally delegated envrronmen- 
tal programs" and that often, letters of clarification from 
state attorneys general have lald EPA's concerns to rest). 
130. See Pacific Gas G Elec. Co. v. Federal Power 
Comm'n, 506 E2d 33.49 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
131. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2. 
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Issue ~nvolve a mit~gated enforcement 
response to a voluntary disclosure of a vlola- 
tlon. Under any c~rcumstances, the Agency 
would w~sh to encourage volunta~y disclosure 
and remediat~on. It would not recqulre a pub- 
lished policy to lustify a mitigated response 
Intended to ach~eve that a1m.134 By t h ~ s  rea- 
sonlng, the Agency gurdance more resembles a 
policy than a rule. 
In the final analysls, the audit policy with- 
stands the Force of Law test. First, the policy 
may or may not create a blnding norm. Even if 
it did, it would blnd the Agency alone, and only 
In the sense that it st~pulates certa~n Agency 
responses to voluntary behav~or 07 the part of 
regulated entitles. Second, EPA apparently 
relies on the audit policy as a statement of law, 
thereby suggesting a rule rather than a policy. 
Thlrd, the Agency can support its policy as if  
the policy statement had never been Issued. 
The audit policy likely clears the first hur- 
dle, stumbles on the second, and clears the 
th~rd. Since all three component.; are neces- 
sary for a policy to have the force of law, the 
audit policy lacks the force of law 
Consequently, under the Force of Law stan- 
dard, a rulemaklng IS not necessary. 
3. Substantial Effects Test 
The Substantla1 Effects test looks less at 
the letter of the Agency dictate than at its 
Impact. In deading whether a policy has a sub- 
stant~al effect and should therefore be a rule, 
courts use a two-pronged analys~:;. First they 
look to whether the purported policy imposes 
any r~ghts or obligat~ons upon the public. 
Second, they attempt to determ~ne whether 
the policy limits an Agency's discret~on In later 
determlnatlons.135 
132. See Herman, supra note 5 
133. See Riedel. supra note 80. 
134. See also Chevron. U.S A Inc v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U S. (137 844 ( I  984) 
(agency ~nterpretations of statutes deserve great judicial 
deference unless they are arbitrary or capnclous) 
135 See. e.g Alaska v. Department of Transp 868 
E2d 441, 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 1989). American Hosp. Ass'n v. 
Bowen, 834 E2d 1037 1046 (D.C. Cir 19871; Community 
Nutrition Inst. if. Young, 818 F2d 943.946 (43 C Cir 1987); 
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The lodestar case for the Substantial 
Effects test IS Community Nutrition Institute v. 
Young.136 In Young, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
"actlon levels" for allowable levels of aflatoxin 
in foods set forth in a policy statement by the 
Food and Drug Admlnistratlon (FDA) constitut- 
ed a rule rather than a policy statement. 
Consequently, the court found that the setting 
of action levels required a rulemaking. 
Under the FDA policy, producers who sold 
food containing aflatoxln levels higher than 
specified were subject to enforcement action. 
Furthermore, the policy's language was stated 
in mandatory terms: contaminants in excess of 
the actlon levels "will be deemed to be adulterat- 
ed."l37 In the court's view, the threat of enforce- 
ment created a new obligation for the public 
while the mandatory nature of the policy lan- 
guage limited the FDA's discretion as to when 
to initlate enforcement proceedings. Since the 
FDA's actlon had a substantially similar effect 
to a rule, it needed to undergo the rulemaklng 
process.138 
4. Applying the Subsfantial Effects Test to 
the Audit Policy 
Apply~ng the two-pronged Substantial 
Effects test to the audit policy y~elds a similarly 
mixed result to that In the Force of Law analy- 
sis. The first prong involves lnquirrng whether 
the Agency statement Imposes any rlghts or 
obligations upon the public. The second prong 
requires assessing whether the policy improp- 
erly limits Agency discretion in later determina- 
t1ons.139 
As noted above, the audit policy does not 
directly Impose obligations on the public.14o It 
simply outlines the Agency's likely response to 
voluntary actlons (self-audit and disclosure) by 
regulated entitles. States are arguably bur- 
dened because the policy obstructs their ability 
Amencan Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 E2d 525, 529 
(D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Royal C .  Gardner. Public Partic~pulion 
and Wetlands Regulation, 10 UCLA J. E W ~ L .  L. G Pa& 1, 10 
(1991) (companng the substantial effects and force of law 
tests). 
136. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 
E2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
137. Id. at 947 (emphasis added). 
FeddsdfktiIPdcy 3 s 
to legislate privilege and immunity laws, Yet, z 0 
this is hardly a burden. SIPS enforce federal law 2 
and are approved or disapproved at the discre- I 
tlon of the federal government. It stands to rea- 2 1 
son that the federal Agency overseeing the SIP 
should have the authority to determine if the 
SIP IS being effectively administered If a states 
laws Interfere with its obligations to cany out 
federal law. then the burden on the state does 
not derive from the audit policy but from feder- 
alism itself In other words, the only constraint 
arislng from the audit policy IS one that already 
existed; that states not pass laws that impede 
the enforceability of federal statutes 
The second question. whether the policy 
improperly limits Agency discretion, rs slightly 
more problemat~c The policy does limit Agency 
discretion by requiring it to forego seeking grav- 
ity-based penalties from qualifying entities. The 
policy also prevents the Agency from recom- 
mending criminal prosecution based on audit 
results 141 It remalns an open question, howev- 
er. whether these limitations are improper. The 
Agency has a clear policy goal of encouraging 
self-audits and disclosure. The audit policy 
accomplishes this goal without forfeiting EPKs 
discretion with regard to serious violators or 
those entitles that choose not to self-audit. The 
only strictures placed on the Agency s behavror 
concern specific mitigat~on measures for those 
entitles that choose to audit. 
Furthermore, even if the limitattons seem 
severe. EPA could argue that they still are 
appropriate As one Agency officra! noted, the 
publication of the intertm and tinaE policy state- 
ments met all the APA procedural safeguards 
for a rulemaking,!" including publicatron IR the 
Federal Register and sohicitatl~n of public com- 
ment.143 Neither of these steps ts required for 
policles If EPA decides to issue the audit poli- 
cy as a rule (which it reserves the right to do at 
138 Set r i l  at 945-48 
139 Set l i f  a1 946 
140 Set Ftnal Palrsy Statement, supra n9te 124, at 
66,712 and accompanying text 
141 Stt F~nal Policy Statement, supra note 2, at 
66,706 
142 Rredel. supra note 79 
143 SPr5USC $553119941 
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z a later date),la it would ~nvolve little more than 
proposing the policy In the Federal Reg1~ter.I~~ 
In light of these extraordinary lengths the 
3 Agency went to In formulating the policy, it 
would be difficult to argue that a few limits on 
Agency discret~on regarding response to a vol- 
untary disclosure from a regulated entity are 
~napproprlate. 
The two components of the Substantla] 
Effects test are whether a policy burdens the 
public and/or ~napproprlately limits Agency dis- 
cretlon. The foregoing discuss~on has shown 
that that the audit policy does neither and that 
it consequently passes the Substantlal Effects 
test. Therefore, under either standard, Force of 
Law or Substantlal Effects, the audit policy does 
not requlre a rulemaklng. 
5 .  EPA Attempts to Legalafe Through 
Policy Memoranda Have Decreased 
EPA has, over the years, acqulred the repu- 
tatlon of a "champion In the game of 'rule by 
memorandum."'~46 Recently, though, the Agency 
has become more sensitlve to the differences 
between polic~es and rules. That sensitivity 
arose of necessity, due to a growlng negatlve 
public response to Agency attempts at govern- 
lng by policy statement. ~rofesior Robert 
Anthony polnts to two lnstructlve examples of 
EPA ~nitially attempting to legislate through 
policy memoranda, then later agreelng either to 
clarify its policy or to Issue a rule.147 
In the first case, EPA stated In the preamble 
to its Not~ce of Clarification approving 
Kentucky's State Implementat~on Plan (SIP) 
under the Clean Alr Act148 that EPA approval of 
144. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at 
66,710 ("[EPAI will cons~der thls issue and will prov~de 
notice if it determines a rulemalung is appropriate."). 
145. See Riedel lntervrew. supra note 80. 
146. See Robert A. Anthony. Interpretive Rules, Policy 
Stakmenls, Curdances. Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal 
Agencres Use Them to Bind the Public?. 4 1 DUKE L.J. 13 1 1. 1346 
(1992). 
147 See id. at 1346-49. 
148. Notification of Clarification, 54 Fed. Reg. 
36,307 ( 1989). 
149 See id. at 36,307-08. 
150. Westvacov. EPA. No. 89-3975 (6th Cir. filed Oa.  
revlslons to a SIP had the effect of "requlr~ng the 
State to follow EPA's current and future Inter- 
pretations of the Act's provlslons as well as 
EPA's operating polic~es and guldance."149 In the 
wake of protests and the commencement of lit- 
1gat1on.150 EPA Issued a second Notlce of 
Clarificat1on151 declaring that ~nterpretatlons 
and gu~dances do not have the force d law and 
that failure to obey them did not, In and of itself, 
vlolate the Clean Alr Act.152 
The second example lnvolved EPA agreeing 
to use a rulemaking to set emrssion standards 
for new facilities or modificat~ori of exlstlng 
facilit~es In reglons currently In conlpliance with 
nat~onal alr quality standards. For years, EPA 
had utilized a "bottom-up" appi-oach to its 
requ~rement that emlsslons linlitat~ons be 
based on "best available control technology" 
(BACT).153 BACT meant that the permitting 
authority welghed several factors to determine 
what technology was achievable and attanable 
under the circumstances. Permittees need not 
lnstall the most effectlve methods of em~ssion 
control if they could demonstrate I hat its costs 
outwe~ghed its benefits. In 1987-88. some 
offices withln EPA began ~mplementlng a "tsp- 
down" approach, requlrlng applicants to use the 
most effectlve technology unless they ccluld 
show it to be Infeasible. In 1988, ElPA ~ssued a 
memorandum statlng that those not uslng "top- 
down" approach to BACT would be deemed per- 
mit deficient and potent~ally subject to enforce- 
ment act1on.15~ 
Litlgatlcln ensued challenging ECPA's author- 
ity to Implement the top-down aporoach with- 
out gong through a leg~slatlve rulemaklng.155 In 
31, 1989). 
15 1. 55 Fed Reg. 23,547-48 (1990) 
152. 42 U.S.C. 4 7402 (1998) 
153. 42 U.S.C. $4 7470-7479 ( 1998) 
154. See Anthony, supra note 146, at 1349 n.221, clt- 
Ing Memorandum from Michael S Alu$hin, Associate 
Enforcement Counsel for Air, Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance hlonitoring, and john S Seitz, Director, 
Stationary Source Compliance Divlsion, Office of Air 
Quality Planning and Standards, to varlous recipients (July 
15, 1988). 
155. The principal case in this dispute was 
Amerlcan Paper Inst. v. Reilly, No. 89-2030 (D.DC filed 
July 18, 1989). See Anthony, supra note 146, at 1389 
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1991, EPA and the pla~ntiffs settled the suits. 
EPA agreed to submit the BACT directive to a 
formal rulemaking and acknowledged that the 
"EPA BACT policy statement IS not Intended 
to create binding legal r~ghts or obligations and 
does not have the force and effect of law."l5Q 
In both of the preceding examples, EPA 
attempted to create a blnding Agency directive 
without undergoing the proper rulemaking pro- 
cedure.157 Each time, widespread protest and 
the commencement of litigation forced the 
Agency to reconsider. Taken together these 
examples Indicate that EPA has, of necessity, 
acquired an Increased sensitlvity to the need for 
a rulemak~ng when the Agency expects expect- 
ing universal compliance with one of its direc- 
twes.158 It bears notlng, however, that t h ~ s  new- 
found sensitlvity came grudgingly, could be 
episodic, and might well van~sh with the next 
president~al election. 
V. ShouId the Audit Policy b e  a Rule 
Instead? 
Though the audit policy IS not a rule In dis- 
guise, the question remalns whether it mlght 
prove more effective and less controvers~al if it 
were made into a rule. An audit rule would con- 
clus~vely set forth EPA's position on what con- 
stitutes legal encouragement for entities that 
w~sh to audit. It would also reduce ambiguity 
and rnlsunderstandings concerning possible 
Agency reactions to audit results. States and 
regulated entitles would enloy the security of 
know~ng with certa~nty what behav~or IS accept- 
able. 
These proposed benefits to an audit rule, 
however, could just as easily be viewed as detrl- 
ments. Specifying the parameters on state audit 
laws removes a great deal of the states' discre- 
tion In enforcing federal env~ronmental laws. 
Even if the rule were flexible, it would still create 
constralnts, otherw~se it would offer no greater 
156. Anthony. supra note 146, at 1389, quoting set- 
tlement agreement for cases cited above, suprd note 12% 
(July 9 and 10. 1991). 
157 The procedure for rulemalung In most cases 1s 
set forth In the APA, 5 U.S.C. Q 553 (1994). The Clean iilr 
Act, however, has its own rulemalung procedure. which IS 
untethered to the APA See 42 U.S.C. $7607(d) (1994) 
Z 
Z clarity than a policy while offer~ng a greater 
threat of enforcement Under the current policy* 
EPA can negot~ate with states regarding the 9 
scope and Impact ~f state statutes If the policy 5 2 
were a rule, it wouPd mandate a particular 
Agency response ( i  e , suspending a state3 abil- 
ity to ~mplernent its SIP) if a glven state law did 
not conform to the rule3 specificat~ons 
Currentlyw both states and EPA have the flexibil- 
ity to craft agreements that may not necessarily 
conform to a rlg~d ~nterpretatlon of the policy 
Often the negot~atlsns leading to such agree- 
ments dispel any cloud of Agency disapproval If 
the poliq~\trere a rule, that flexibility would Iike- 
ly disappear Citlzens"roups would file suit to 
force the rule"s enforcement and the Agency 
would have no ch01ce but to adhere str~ctPy to 
the letter of the law 
Perhaps the most important constituency tn 
the rulefpolicy debate IS the regulated commu- 
nity, Yet, even here, the choice between a rule 
and a policy offers no clearly supenor option If 
the audit policy were a rule, it u?ould present 
clearly delineated dictates that an entity could 
follo\t1, or disregard at its peril The enttty could 
also challenge the rule In court, an option that 
presents cons~derabty fewer complicat~ons than 
challeng~ng a policy ' 4 4  
A rule deslgnatlng critec~a for enforcement 
act~ons \vould create the potentmi tot volurnr- 
nous litlgatlon The affected entrty could Iitr- 
gate whether it has met every cctterron for ttrg- 
gerrng an enforcement actton For exampIe, if  
the Agency dectded to seek gravtty-based 
penalties from an entity under the current pol- 
ICY reglme, the entity could nat challenge tts 
dec~s~on based on a supposed tack sf adher- 
ence t~ the audit policy If the policy were a 
rule. however. the entity could Eitrgate rts non- 
compliance \v~th each of the nine delineated 
factors before paying the penalty Thts oppor- 
tunity to lit~gate the rnechanlcs of the rule's 
enforcement would arguabIy benefit the regw- 
I58 SEr ,%-tthsn.$ suprd note 146, at 1349 
159 SPt Arrrhar; :upm nzte 100 and arz~mpanping 
te~t  idlscusstng nebulous standards presented 6;. the 
Farce a1 L5'x and Su'tisrantr31 Imp31 test1 W ~ t h  rules, the 
gu!delincs t;r rudtcral rc;ie.x are burlt ~ n t ~  the APA. 5 
U S C $70.1 I 19911 
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I lated community. The torrent of litigation and resulting i l l  will with the Agency could, howev- er, also work to industry's detriment. 
3 Furthermore, for entitles, just as for states, 
the clarity offered by a rule comes with a prtce. 
Just as clothlng labeled "one slze fits all" fits no 
one particularly well, so too does a rule 
deslgned for universal applicability lose its 
ability to customize itself to suit a particular 
entity. Lastly, regulated entitles, like state and 
federal agenaes, might find themselves the 
target of cit~zen enforcement suits designed to 
force the rule's enforcement. That could result 
In unnecessary enforcement actlons and/or 
needless expenditures of tlme and resources In 
litlgat~on. 
VI. Conclusion 
Sound policy reasons exlst for an audit 
policy that encourages self-audits and volun- 
tary disclosure. EPA's audit policy adequately 
meets those needs. State laws seeking to 
strengthen the allure of self audits by pr~vileg- 
Ing audit results and/or lmrnun~zing the viola- 
tor seem gratuitous and potentially detrimen- 
tal. There exlsts no evldence to suggest that 
the federal policy's lack of privilege or immuni- 
ty has deterred Industry from auditing, or v~o- 
lators from coming forward. Furthermore, 
grantlng prlvilege or immunity to violators 
allows an unfalr advantage over lndustrles that 
comply with environmental laws. 
Volume 5, Number 3 
Second, though In some respects the audit 
policy sk~rts dangerously close to a disgu~sed 
rule, it does not require a rulemaklng under 
either the Force of Law or the substantial 
Effects tests. The judicial standard for deter- 
mlnlng a rule from a policy remalns ambigu- 
ously drawn. Nonetheless, glven that the audit 
policy merely sets forth guidelines for Agency 
response to voluntary behavlor from the regu- 
lated sector, and since the Final Policy 
Statement was Issued after exte!nsrve public 
comment and debate, thls does not appear to 
be an example of the Agency governrng by pol- 
~ c y  rather than by APA approved rules. 
Lastly, while rules offer clarity, they also 
dimlnlsh flexibility on all sides while Inereas- 
lng the likelihood of lit~gat~on. The advantages 
offered to states and the regulated community 
do not appear to outwe~gh the potential detrl- 
ments. Probably the most important indicator 
of the appropriateness of a policy rather than a 
rule IS that no state or regulated entity has 
challenged the policy's validity or clalmed that 
it IS a rule In disguise. Instead, statist~cs how 
an lncreaslng amount of self-auclits and con- 
formity with the audit policy even though the 
majority of states have declined to create a 
statutory prlvilege or Immunity for auditors. 
Furthermore, most of the states :hat do have 
prlvilege or immunity statutes hate negotiated 
the statutes' parameters with EPA and do not 
fear Agency reprisal. 
The policy works; a rule may not work as 
well. Why disturb a good thlng? 
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